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Abstract
With the growing number of cyber security threats affecting the business environment of many
organizations, especially the IT environment. With the growing number of cyber security threats
affecting the business environment of many organizations, especially the IT environment. Managed
protection systems, including SOC, are highly sought after. Managed protection systems, including
SOC, are highly sought after. The problem with SOC is that when building up their own SOC or
hiring a third-party to provide SOC, organizations are not able to apply adequate criteria or standard
frameworks. The aim of the study is to lay the foundations for developing a modern system of
systematic operation centers for the next generation (NGSOC) for IIoT climate. This paper contains
thorough, qualitative literature survey on the implementation of a Security Operation Centre (SOC).
A comparative study is carried out using a variety of previous research sources and a literature review.
The findings from the report show that previous research is not adequately guided, especially in the
safety and technical aspects of the building block of the SOC. It is hoped that by proposing the
framework, cybersecurity threat prevention and identification would be strengthened even further.
The success of the NGSOC will ultimately be determined by the integration of individuals, procedure,
and technology.
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1. Introduction
The 2017 Internet Security Threat Report of Symantec Corporation shows that over 7.1 billion iden-
tities are exposed to data infringements [1]. The 2017 Internet Security Threat Report of Symantec
Corporation shows that over 7.1 billion identities are exposed to data infringements [1]. Cyber-
attacks have wreaked havoc on an unparalleled scale. To make a big effect, attackers often used very
basic tools and tactics. A Security Operations Center (SOC) is generally a department set up to
maintain the security of an organization. In practice, a SOC is a community of people who monitor,
analyze and safeguard the information system of an entity such as servers, networks, databases and
more [2]. Simultaneously, the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) nation, where it is in a company’s
best interest to hire highly skilled workers. professionals who are well-versed in the technology they
endorse and use on a regular basis. They must understand and be proficient in the use of Security
Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, loggers, physical security infrastructure, Pro-
tocol analyzers, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and vulnerability scanners, to name a few, must
all be capable of dealing with today’s cyber-threat setting. They will need to be aware of the method
of collecting data from these sources and of how to correctly increase stakeholder security concerns.
So what are really the things we don’t have? Eight people died and 48 others were injured on the
3 June 2017 London Bridge terror attack. The government’s intelligence body has some major short-
comings, according to the security analysts’ study. They stressed the large amount of intelligence
data available in a number of sizes and sources. These could all be combined to form a comprehen-
sive intelligence picture, including terabytes of data, talks and CCTV vidos. The information was
provided but the information in the intelligence activity, which enabled attackers to radar, could not
be proceeded, interpreted or contextualized [3]. Cyber-assaults, such as advanced persistent attack
(API) are increasingly being targeted, complex and technically advanced (APT). Managing too many
incidents can be disastrous and time-consuming for most organizations [4].
In general, there are current IT companies frameworks and best practices such as CoBIT 5, ITIL
and ISO/IEC 27001:2013. Neither, however, is tailor-made for the SOC system. Several studies [5]
identified SOC problems and limitations that can be further categorized into the following categories
[2]:
a) People
– There is a scarcity of security professionals who are both trained and experienced.
– Ineffective management and a lack of financial responsibility
b) Process
– Most software come with a collection of default correlation rules that aren’t always the
best fit for a particular situation.
– In the current phase, there is a lack of constructive reaction.
c) Technology
– Instead of a scientific method, the choice of technologies and techniques depends on the
market.
– The basic line to pick SOC tools is not sufficient
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Frost & Sullivan is a consulting firm. By 2020, the industry expects a shortage of 1 5 million ISO
professionals and cites the major problem as looking for adequate staff [6]. While the NGSOC retains
the capability to detect threats, it is a model that is aimed at identifying new threats that have not
been identified on any previous basis. To achieve this capability, organizations must invest in the
correct areas and integrate their available resources.
NGSOC uses an approach that involves security enforcement points and analysis approaches on
threats, rather than concentrating on security endpoints. Instead of focusing on security endpoints,
the NGSOC employs a security enforcement and analytical approach on risk [2]. Building a high-level
NGSOC takes considerable time and resources. The work is therefore considered more of a sprint
than a marathon. The initial motivation for this study is to seek a shared methodology in helping
organizations develop their own internal NGSOC or providing guidelines for the involvement of NG-
SOC third-party providers. The main reason for the NGSOC requirement is that cyber security risks
are reduced to the lowest possible.
In this study, a large qualitative literature survey will be conducted to investigate existing SOC
and cybersecurity practises. A new NGSOC system will be proposed to provide organisations with
comprehensive guidance for acquiring or implementing NGSOC. To summarise, a specialised NG-
SOC with the appropriate technology, processes, and qualified personnel must be established as a
central component at the heart of a successful incident response process. SOCs need coordinated
cross-disciplinary teams with very specialized skills in the fight against advanced cyber threats. Such
skills and qualified staff in the safety community are therefore severely lacking in developing, oper-
ating, and sustaining SOCs.
The following is the structure of this paper: The methods of systematic observation and a liter-
ature review on the subject are covered in Section II. Section III includes a compilation of previous
work and the SOC model, which is divided into six categories: stakeholder, governance, stability,
technological, functionality, and intelligence. The intentional contribution to comparative analysis is
discussed in Section IV and conclusions are discussed in Section V.
2. METHODOLOGY
The primary concern is evaluating previous research approaches to carrying out SOC practises.
Since this is a non-empirical analysis focused primarily on extensive library studies, a comparative
method of evaluation is used as the primary tool. A data extraction process was carried out in
order to pick a range of publications for the comparative analysis. The stages of data extraction are
depicted in Figure 1 below.
There are three stages which are: Search Stage 1, Selection Stage 1 and Search Stage 3, the
first step is by searching on Scopus, the abstract and citation database, with the keyword ’Security
Operations Centre’ The first step. From this initial search a total of 1720 papers emerged. Further
indexing is carried out on the parameters reported in last 10 years and filtered with three other
keywords, including ’SIEM,’ ’Correlation’ and ’Framework,’ in the Computer Science Topic Journal.
The results of the quest for ’Searching Stage 1’ are sorted by the name of your publisher. We may
identify from the sorting method the top 6 publishers that actively publish research on SOC. The
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Figure 1: Data Extraction Stages
total number of papers in the first stage is 51 after removing duplicates.
’Selection Stage 1’ entails a systematic study and analysis of 51 pieces of literature. Then, 23
papers out of 51 are chosen as important publications. Finally, 11 papers are summarized and selected
for the comparative analysis, and 12 other papers are selected for the purpose of comparative study.
Due to its similarities to the SOC model, the remaining paper from the three stages was chosen.
In this section, we will examine in detail the descriptive comparison, analyze the characteristics,
strengths and weaknesses of each SOC model. Following that, this paper presents the study in the
form of a figure for easier understanding and visualization. It is anticipated that future research will
develop a structured structure through comparative analysis.
3. RELATED WORK
A general literature review reveals that the SOC consists of three key elements: personnel, process,
and technology. Because the cybersecurity climate is evolving constantly, it is crucial to understand
the current policies, processes, and controls in the industry and how these elements are monitored.
The comparative research aims at developing a model theoretical framework that can withstand
validation by testing in different practical environments and current results.
4. STAKEHOLDER
A stakeholder is an individual or group of people who have an interest in and may influence
or be influenced by a corporation. NGSOC stakeholders include the service acquisition firm, cus-
tomers, business partners and NGSOC personnel, contractors, and consultants. NGSOCs need to be
established and maintained to protect their businesses.
4.1. Stakeholder Requirements
Every day, each company manages a large amount of data in its daily operations. This led to
the need for automation and convergence in cyber-attack prevention, detection and response [8].
Real-time monitoring of security incidents achieves the following objectives:
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Figure 2: Building Blocks of NGSOC. Reprinted from “Building a World-Class Security Operations Centre: A Road
Map”, [7]
• Security accidents identification (incidents); device vulnerabilities detection; quality manage-
ment of safety measures ensured.
• Provide forensic evidence for cybercrime investigations.
• Control over the method of change management.
According to Schinagl, Schoon, and Paans [9], the commercial interests that must be covered are
the organisations’ clients and partners. Moreover, a classification of data exchanged between these
parties includes privately, confidentially or financially related information, which is an exchange of
information to be protected. According to the policy criteria of the Bank Negara Malaysia [10],
financial institutions need to improve SOC capacity. This requires constant monitoring in order to
detect anomalous behavior, recognise potential breaches and enforce successful reactions. In addi-
tion, penetration tests, vulnerability assessments, malware detection and forensics must be carried
out.
A number of authoritative documents and normative documents provide for monitoring when
required It is essential to consider the legal and regulatory provisions which may influence the type
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of information which can be collected and monitored before interacting with any activities involving
the owners of the information. In certain situations, the customer must obtain the consent before
his data can be processed. In general, the law will require financial institutions to track certain
information. These requirements differ from country to country. The goal of this research will
therefore be to find a common ground that most organizations would use to deal with SOC [11].
4.2. Service Management
SOC establishes a written agreement with their customer about their particular level of service as
a service provider. By establishing a set of quantifiable goals, they work together to define and agree
on an appropriate standard of service [12]. The following are the components that can be measured:
• Incidents are events that occur when a certain condition is exceeded.
• Outages: An occurrence that causes an activity to become inaccessible.
• Downtime refers to the amount of time that has passed since an event occurred.
• Availability refers to the amount of time a service is available for use.
These priorities are part of a service level agreement (SLA). This contract also provides detailed
definitions of the duties, responsibilities and contracting services provided by the SOC. If the service
is provided at the expected standard, it should also specify explicitly the remedies or penalties that
are in effect. Additional observable data:
• The SIEM log list should indicate that logs should be included.
• The average time it takes to operate a new log source.
• The accumulated number of minutes that such devices could not submit logfiles.
• The cumulative number of minutes without operation for all applications is
• The accumulated time the SIEM did not receive log files.
• The number of cases of threat identification increases (minimum 20 cases for priority assets,
10 cases for the lower priority system). The number of assets without a minimum number of
cases of use is also increasing.
• The total number of threat models for an asset that do not have the required number of cases
of SIEM use.
Miloslavskaya [13] suggests that SOC integrate safety events with SLA criteria, since it is impor-
tant for companies because it helps to evaluate damages arising from an affected network or other
offsite events. SOC also creates business models and analyses the effect of various security incidents
on these models, according to the article. The determination of asset costs, on the other hand, would
be a clear disadvantage of this approach.
a) SOC services have their own Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Key Performance Indicators
(KPI) like all other services, which determine the ROI (ROI). The following indicators can be
relevant for senior management, according to [14].
b) The cumulative number of events uncovered over time.
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c) False positives, false negatives, true negatives, and true positive are all numbers that can be
used to measure the number of false positives, false negatives, and true negatives.
d) Top 5 or 10 cyber-attacks by country of origin, nation-state funding, capability and severity
e) Internal policy breaches, noncompliance, and the severity of exposures are summarized in this
report.
f) Misuse and harassment of privileged users in a nutshell
Security administration, incident response, security monitoring, regulatory assistance, remedia-
tion, security infrastructure, security roadmap and planning, digital forensics, threat research, eDis-
covery and collecting legal proof are just some of the SOC’s services [8]. Around the same time,
companies and their service needs evolve over time. Rather than being regarded as a static text,
SLA should be revised on a regular basis. The following are some of the variables that may influence
the changes: customer’s business expectations measurements, calculation methods, and procedures
workloads technological climate.
In terms of SOC capabilities, the monitoring service is a significant activity. Some SOCs have
security analysts monitoring the service around the clock, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, while
others control during business hours, usually from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with on-call Level 2
and Level 3 support for major incidents, while still others run only during business hours, with no
support. It’s important to remember, however, that the SOC’s operational structure is determined
by business needs and the security policy of the company [14].
NGSOC Management
Grobler, Jacobs, and Niekerk [11] talk about two different ways to provide SOC services:
• Internal SOC
SOCs that serve an organization’s internal security requirements are described as SOCs. Only
one consumer is served by this model. There are two types of deployments: clustered and
distributed (global service requirements)
• MSSP (Managed Security Service Provider)
Security devices and systems, such as the IPS and firewall, are monitored and managed remote-
ly. This model caters to a variety of customers from various sectors, as well as from different
countries in some cases.
SOCs are sometimes treated as one SOC, regionally or through the cloud, according to a survey
study [8]. Most respondents’ SOCs (61%) are currently clustered in one location. As shown in Figure
3, the second largest group (28 percent) said their SOC functions were spread through various security
and response units, while 25 percent said their SOCs were centralized and distributed regionally, and
17 percent said they brought all their SOC functions into the cloud. The blue bar indicates an
organization with its headquarters in the United States, while the red bar indicates an organization
with its headquarters in Europe.) SOCs may be incorporated into a company’s internal operations
or outsourced to a third-party supplier. The benefits and drawbacks of these alternatives [13]:
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Figure 3: Location and Centralization of SOCs, 2017 .
The SOC model, according to a previous study [4] has seven dimensions. The categorization is
based on an initial visit to the operation center and the collection of data. The following measure-
ments are included:
i. Scope
SOC is defined in terms of its sphere of influence, economic or government sector, functional
position, functional operation, speed, and size by the scope dimension. The model is made
up of the following main elements: effect emphasis, field, power, size, functions, functional
abstraction, response form, and response timeline.
ii. Activities
a) Protection
Routine procedures, system administration, installation and configuration management,
formal training, monitoring and planning of infrastructure are all part of infrastructure
management.
b) Incident Management
Procedures, acts, and practices for detecting, reporting, analyzing, informing, cooperating,
and responding to incidents.
c) Analysis
Information about missions, user activities, use, traffic, performance accidents, risks, vul-
nerabilities, security systems, and incident management are assessed using a collection of
protocols, acts, and activities.
iii. Organizational Dynamics
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Table 1: Pros and Cons of Server Location
In-house Outsourced
Advantages
Better understanding of their own
environment, more effective, easier
customization, improved correlation
process, and more affordable pricing
of tools.
Often less expensive because there are
no upfront costs, more impartial
because there are more experienced resources
available, less chance of corruption, and unbiased.
Drawbacks
Significant investments are
required, there is a high risk
of collusion, and large-scale
trends are less likely to be
recognized as compared to
specialized third-party experience.
There is less information about IoTI;
staff is less vigilant; there is a chance
of external data mishandling; and there
is no long-term benefit for IoTI.
The following factors influence how a company changes over time: growth rate, sustainability,
organizational change, project transformation, and source of funding.
iv. Facilities
Installations are distinguished by room size, number of desks, overload capacity, operating
hours, configuration style, variety of continuity, ongoing organizational preparation (COOP)
and methods of teamwork.
v. Process Management
The level of application and ongoing changes in standard practices in organizations was founded
on four factors: training and qualification, successful use of SOPs, development, and analysis.
vi. External Interactions
SOC-sponsored formal, informal relations. The willingness of the center to listen and react to
events influences these interactions. Six outside organizations are: emergency, international,
trade, government, law enforcement, and intelligence.
vii. Environment
In the SOC’s operating culture, the atmosphere has an impact. There are six characterization
factors for the environment: visibility, scope, data handling, capacity, stability external and
communication within the group.
Stakeholder Reporting
He has indicated that reports should be customised for user groups in a study carried out by
[14]. It is enough to provide a summary of the security position on a ’high standard’ basis for senior
management. However, the reports need to be altered from a technical point of view for system
administrators, security architects and SOC managers in order to avoid further and potential events.
The criteria for stakeholder reporting were not stated however, the criteria for inclusion in technical
reports are:
a) Attack date and time
b) Reference date, time and log
c) Malware name, application stream identified and compromised path
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d) Geographical IP position of the source of the fraudulent transaction risk ranking, data stream
e) Entity ID, traffic ID, IP address, system ID of boundary, exploit-invoked order
Governance
Governance aims to improve information technology management and control (IT) in the inter-
ests of primary stakeholders. The Board of the company has a responsibility to ensure the good
governance of IT along with other key business functions. COBIT 5 is a structure for IT governance
[15], outlining five concepts such as:
i. Meeting Stakeholder Needs
There is a company to build trust and provide its stakeholders with value.
ii. Covering the Enterprise End-to-end
Covers all company tasks and procedures. Instead, they consider information and related
technology as an asset which must be handled by anyone inside the company just like every
other asset.
iii. Applying a Single Integrated Framework
A company may choose to comply with other recent and applicable norms, for example ITIL
series, TOGAF and ISO/IEC 27000.
iv. Enabling a Holistic Approach
Systemic control by interconnected facilitators.
v. Separating Governance from Management
In terms of function and organizational structure, the two were clearly distinguished.
It is the board’s duty to ensure that cyber threats are mitigated. Lenders, regulators, and
consumers are all accountable. Adopting governance values that invest in people and emphasize
collaboration leads to sustainable governance. Therefore, operating an operation center is not a
one-person affair and as such, industry company must cooperate and exchange information that will
allow better detection and prevention of attacks.
Facilities Management
When designing SOC facilities, the following considerations must be considered [4]:
• Physical space scale; number of seats available for SOC employees; potential for staff expansion
during high-priority events; operating hours
• Resources layout and physical settings (personnel, equipment, and furniture).
• Percentage of continuity resources.
• Dedicated resources time can be put into action if necessary.
• Methods of communication.
People Management
The modern SOC business is hierarchically organised around SIEM scheme, according to Bhatt,
Manadhata, and Zomlot [16]. In general, SOC consists of a number of security analysts (SA). At
present, three stage SA are best practised. The team works 8-12 hours a day around the clock. Due
to their long working hours and the enormous workload for Level 1 SAs, the duration of retention is
also short, including training for less than two years. The security analysts’ roles and responsibilities
are shown in the table below.
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Table 2: Security Analysts Roles
Security Analysts Duties & Responsibilities
Level 1
• Monitor the SIEM system alert screen
• Triage events (decide events severity level)
• Escalate rules to SOC engineer/higher level SA in case of high number
of false positives
• Escalate alert for further investigation for when they cant classify
an alert as either an attack or false positives
Level 2
• Maintain vigilance over the SIEM device alert screen.
• Events are prioritized (the intensity level of the incident is determined).
• If a large number of false positives occur, escalate the rules to the
SOC engineer/higher level SA.
• If they are unable to classify a warning as a false positive or an attack,
they escalate the alert for further investigation.
• Examine the alerts that L1 SAs have mentioned as potential attacks.
Prepare a case study
• Make a case and send it to the forensic team (if breach is identified)
Level 3
• Assemble a forensic team and security engineers
• Determine the scope and effect of the attack.
• L2 can be used to fine-tune rules to minimize false alarms.
At present there is little talent pool available for trained analysts. As the SOC employees’ skills
and expertise are far more critical than investing in tools, the organizations need to resolve this
deficiency. Since cyber-attack is increasingly sophisticated and complex, SOC must rely heavily on
a human element in order to protect cyber space. SOCs need the Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO), who reports to the Chief Information Officer, to have a solid organization (CIO). They work
together in accordance with the organization’s mission and security objectives [9]. The employees of
SOC have to deal with the constantly changing world, so training is necessary to fulfil their tasks
[7], as stated in Table 2.
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Table 3: Staff Duties and Training Needs. Adapted from Building a World-Class Security Operations Centre: A
Roadmap, by A. Torres, 2015, SANS Institute.
Job Title Duties & Responsibilities Training/Certification
Tier 1
Alert Analyst
• Continuously monitors the alert queue
• Conduct security alert prioritization
• Monitors health of security sensors
and endpoints
• Collects data required to
initiate task for Tier 2









• Performs thorough incident analysis
by correlating data from various sources
• Determines if a critical system or
data set has been affected
• Advises on rectification
• Provides support for new
analytic methods for detecting threats
• Advanced network forensics
• Host-based forensics





• SANS SEC501: Advanced
Security Essentials Enterprise
Defender
• SANS SEC503: Intrusion
Detection In-Depth
• SANS SEC504: Hacker Tools, Techniques,






• Look for incident, rather than
waiting for escalated incidents
• Involves in development,
implementation, and fine tuning
of threat detection analytics
• Advanced training on anomalies detection
• Tool-specific training for data aggregation,
analysis, and threat intelligence
• SANS SEC503: Intrusion Detection
In-Depth
• SANS SEC504: Hacker, Tools, Techniques,
Exploits and Incident Handling
• SANS SEC561: Intense Hands-on
Pen Testing
• SANS FOR610: Reverse-Engineering
Malware: Malware Analysis Tools and
Techniques
SOC Manager
• Manages resources (personnel,
budget, shift scheduling,
technology strategy) to meet SLAs
• Communicates with management
• In-charge for business-critical incidents
• Provides overall direction
for the SOC and input to








When new workers are hired for the SOC, they will receive on-boarding training that includes
functional training, security awareness, and a security culture program [17]:
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i. Functional training
A fundamental training to learn the process, resources, strategies, laws, and regulations of the
organization.
ii. Security awareness
The main goal of education is to minimize the likelihood of social engineering assaults. The
information security chain is usually referred to by employees as the weakest link. So routine
situational drills, safety knowledge and social engineering assessments are critical.
iii. Security culture
A long-term campaign is the development of a security culture. It involves more than a person’s
safety. The whole team can work together and efficiently interact. In case of a suspicious
incident, employees should be encouraged to inquire, inform, report and act accordingly. To
allow them to comply with the rules and protocols, they must be informed about the sanctions
and implications of data leakage or security infringement.
Operational Management
The operating configurations of each SOC will be different. In other words, one approach does not
inherently apply to another to the detection of cyber threats. It is important that your aims, your
risk appetite and the environment are understood according to each individual organization. A SOC
may involve individuals with a range of skills, processes and even use technology. A SOC may depend
on a third-country service provider or have hybrid capability [9]. This research will take account of
parameters relating to human processes and technology to create NGSOC to decide the optimal
solution for each organization. SOCs can generally be divided into two different types of operational
methodology as defined in Tables 4 and 5 regarding counteraction capacity and deployment scenarios:
Table 4: Counteraction Capabilities
Counteraction
capabilities
SOC without counteraction capabilities Reactionary SOC
Description
SOC is using IDS. It tracks and
visualizes security incidents and
prioritizes them. If an attack is
observed, no response measures
are taken. SOC’s main aim is to
process data, visualize events and
comply with regulations.
Instead of detection of attack, preventive
measures are taken to stop the attack
from SOC apply the IPS principle. The
automatic mitigation feature provides
rapid response to IS threats.




Requirements for high availability
Open System Software, Netforensics,
and the eTrust Security Information
CA Management Solution
High levels of confidentiality are required
(E.g., banking)
Check Point Eventia Analyzer, IBM Tivoli
Security Operation Manager Software, and
Cisco Monitoring Analysis and Response
System
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Table 5: Deployment Scenarios.
Deployment Scenarios Centralized Distributed
Description
SOCs are deployed on a single
device/server that handles all
aspects of information security
management.
Multiple devices/servers are
being deployed. The load
balancing between them takes
place simultaneously.
Advantages
Greater speed, ease of installation
and relatively low cost.
Better performance and overall
effective SOC.
Drawbacks
Greater pace, easier assembly,
and low cost. Suitable for small
to medium sized environments only.
Due to multiple devices used,
costs are greater, and deployment
and maintenance is more complex.
[9] found there is no broadly adopted structure, as most SOCs are organic, designed and imple-
mented in a specific manner. Processes implemented by security experts that they believe is the
solution to their company’s objectives. Processes build best-in-class processes with the support of
available resources (e.g. safety knowledge, financing, prior experience). Much IT departments are
SOCs. Various SOC formats [9] for example: The following are:
i. Integral SOC:
Analysts and consultants involved in developing safe services would later perform compliance
scanning and continuous monitoring. Additionally, SOC offers infrastructure assistance. This
structure enables the most effective exchange of information.
ii. Technology driven SOC
Infrastructure support and activities should be prioritized. Near coordination with engineers
in the operational environment leads to greater effectiveness.
iii. Partly outsourced SOC
In terms of size and capacity, infrastructure and workers are limited. As a result, monitoring
and scanning services are contracted out to a third-party vendor. Information exchange and
teamwork are relatively weak because of the outsourcing relationship.
iv. Specialized SOC
Certain SOC are extremely specialized. They may wish to safeguard a particular piece of
critical infrastructure. From classified sources, intelligence and knowledge about threats are
collected. They employ security specialists, for example, to safeguard industrial control systems
(ICS) and supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA).
Framework
When developing a SOC, it is important to bear in mind that both external and internal criteria
must be met. Conforming to a certain number of frameworks or certifications can increase an MSSP’s
marketability. Grobler, Jacobs, and Niekerk [11], suggest a range of relevant structures and standards
for guiding and directing the development of SOCs. To resolve the full range of SOC requirements,
it is also recommended to employ a combination of the following frameworks:
i. ITIL
ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) is an acronym for Information Technol-
ogy Infrastructure Library. OGC is the issuer. While ITIL is very similar to CoBIT in several
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respects, the difference is that ITIL establishes standards from an organizational ICT perspec-
tive, while CoBIT establishes standards from a process-based and risk-based perspective.
ii. CoBIT 5
Control Objective over Information and Related Technology is the abbreviation. CoBIT is pub-
lished by the Information System Control Association (ISACA), a not-for-profit organization
dedicated to information technology governance. Its primary purpose is to assist organiza-
tions in mapping their information technology processes to ISACA best practices. Through
implementing these activities, the enterprise’s information and associated technologies can be
regulated and handled holistically.
iii. ISO/IEC 27001:2013 and ISO/IEC 27002:2013
Both are security standards that apply to information systems. The ISO Board is the frame-
work’s issuer. They cover a smaller but more comprehensive domain than ITIL and CoBIT.
Both requirements enable an agency to be audited formally for enforcement by an independent
and certified body.
Security
Security domain definitions, structures, and models are used to ensure a stable environment for
SOC implementation. The following requirements are critical: information security policy, procedure,
procedures, technology, security models, data protection, and staff security.
Policy, Procedure and Process
• According to the NIST Computer Security Incident Handling Guide [18], it suggest the following
organizational structure for the security incident handling process:
• Create a protocol, a strategy, and procedures for incident response.
• Prepare incident reports with the required agency.
• Develop protocols for communicating with other parties about security incidents.
• Relevant personnel should be recruited and trained
• Determine which other groups within the company will be required to participate in certain
aspects of the process.
• Determine the types of services they can provide
According to Torres [7], the DOE/CIAC model is a commonly used incident response process
model, and it consists of six stages: preparation, identification, containment, eradication, recovery,
and lessons learned. The model helps to standardize SOC analysts’ behavior and ensures that no
important tasks are ignored during the process. The functions and tasks of team members are de-
fined by implementing a repeatable incident management procedure, from alert generation and initial
Level 1 assessment to escalation to Level 2 or Level 3 personnel. It also allows for efficient resource
distribution.
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Figure 4: Process of Threat Mitigation and Management
Identifying threats by event reporting is the first step in the threat mitigation and management
process. The probability, expense, timetable, technological efficiency, and capability of identified
events are all evaluated. When an accident is upgraded to an incident, it is classified as a hazard.
Second, the threat’s effect is evaluated. Thirdly, risks would be prioritized and analyzed. For threats
with a medium to high level of criticality, incidents will be constantly monitored and, if necessary,
transferred to the incident management team. Low-level risks can be monitored further. The final
and final move is threat reduction. This move involves incident management and ongoing monitoring
to ensure that the company is aware of the status of threats [11].
Technical
The aim of the technical domain is for the SOC to have the appropriate facilities, technologies, poli-
cies, and procedures in place to provide cyber security monitoring, detection, and response services.
4.3. Architecture
Data collection, data processing, correlation analysis, and visualization are the four key compo-
nents of SOC architecture design [19]. Figure 5 depicts the architecture model.
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Figure 5: The architecture of SOC
Each unit carries out the following functions:
i. Data Collection
Data collect from security devices such as VPNs, firewalls, routers, intrusion detection systems,
and servers. Data is collected in the form of asset logs and security incidents. These data are
collected via Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and SYSLOG.
ii. Data Processing
This unit is comprised of three main processes: data filtering, data merging, and data format-
ting. The first method eliminates redundant data, eliminates superfluous data, and reduces
the large number of events. As a result, it becomes easier to locate the necessary data. Da-
ta merging is the process of combining several related pieces of data according to predefined
laws. Similarly, would minimise the number of duplicated incidents. The data format converts
disparate types of data into a cohesive body.
iii. Correlation Analysis
Correlation analysis is used to identify possible risks, prevent false and duplicated data, produce
valid incidents, and optimise the network’s performance and protection. Correlation rules are
used to identify various types of attacks across the network, and these rules are customized to
the user’s specifications.
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iv. Visualization
Visualize the findings of the network’s security assessment.
Technology Selection
The fundamental technology SOC must achieve includes data collection, aggregation, detection,
management, and analytical solutions [7]. SOC requires continuous data collection from various data
sources to foster a more efficient security monitoring framework (Refer figure 6). It is important
to remember that data silos in every company are adverse and prevent cooperation on security
monitoring in their life. Furthermore, the capacity of an incident- and before-incident tracking
system that collects data allows the safety analysts to use the system rather than a detection tool.
The compatibility of the selected technology is also significant.
Figure 6: Data Aggregation. Reprinted from Building a World-Class Security Operations Centre: A Road Map, by
Alissa T, 2015
The Author emphasises the following criteria/capabilities in technology selection:
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i. Visibility Visibility
ii. Get an insight into the danger by potential anomalies.
iii. Analysis enables SOC analysts to analyse large volumes of incident data and triage equipment.
iv. Actuations: Automatically adjust, manually or both. Patching, modifying firewalls, quaran-
tining method, invalidating a certain certificate, for example.
Tool Selection
This section describes tool selection for SOC [13].
i. Software
Constructed with server software installed. The SOC will benefit from the deployment of
several servers where it can be used for further tasks.
ii. Hardware
Built around servers with SOC software enabled. It is easier to deploy this solution. However,
since the environment is isolated, no more applications can be added.
iii. Infrastructure Solution
SOC is a prepared, tool-based solution. The ability to normalize, aggregate and correlate using
the database and queries is carried out. A comparatively lower cost and greater flexibility are
the advantages of implementing this approach. The need for technical personnel to increase
SOC capabilities gradually, however, is one downside.
Security event is also unusual in most companies today. Many security professionals manually
perform log checks and for others the simple SIEM framework implementation is a minimum. About
the SIEM scheme, the analysis [20] suggested grouping selection criteria into two categories:
i. Functional criteria
To decide whether the SIEM tool will accomplish what it should. Collection of logs, standard-
ization of incidents, correlation and warning management is the key feature.
ii. Technical criteria
• Vendor: The choice of the supplier is dependent on several factors including quality and
price ratios, the popularity of the supplier, quality, operation, information security expertise,
engagement in research and development and its independence from other suppliers.
• Integration: Find the compatibility and data processing and normalization of the product for
all operating requirements.
• Ease of deployment
Evolution of the product: To maintain high functionality and therefore satisfy the requirements
of companies, the evolution of the state of the chosen product must be considered. You can easily
obtain a new version of the goods with patch updates.
The author noted however that one organization could not possibly provide the best SIEM sys-
tem for a particular organization, thus emphasizing that each organization should conduct its own
assessment to choose the best system for its setting.
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Operations
Cyber security practices such as protecting a portion of the cyber space and monitoring and
analyzing threats and events, as well as responsive and proactive defense from emerging threats,
are examples of cyber security practices.as well as management and recovery from incidents, have
been described by Kowtha, Nolan and Daley [4] as activities. Near communication between SOCs
is important to protect the cyberspace. For example, it is useful for one company to support one
another with tactics, strategies and procedures used by malignant sources, identified and deduced.
As shown in Figure 7, SOC requires a CISO and CIO governing body.
Figure 7: Technical Operation Flow of a SOC
The five-core feature ’Identify,’ ’Protect,’ ’Detect,’ ’React’ and ’Recover’ is defined in the NIST cy-
Grasp on Next Generation Security Operation ... 12 (2021) No. 2, 867-896 887
bersecurity framework. Those five functions serve as the primary pillar in carrying out cybersecurity
projects. They help organizations portray their cybersecurity risk management at a high level and
help them The role ’Safety by Design’ ensures the safe development of service. They ensure that the
manufacturing environment is passed on only with the safe solution. The business impact analysis,
risk analyse and data protection analysis are another phase that has taken place in this function
[9]. Intelligence, basic safety, surveillance, pen testing and risk management decisions are the other
five areas [21]. In scholarly writing, information on functionality was widely discussed. The NGSOC
system must comply with the cyber security framework because of its value. The table below under-
lines the heatmap of the instruments used by SOCs which meet five NIST Cybersecurity Framework
functions:
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Table 6: Heatmap of tools used by SOC in regard to NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Functionality Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) X X X
Intrusion Protection System (IPS)
√
X X




Endpoint Monitoring and Logging X
SIEM X X X
Windows Event Log Monitoring X X
Risk Analytic X X
Threat Intelligence X X X
Asset Management X
Continuous Vulnerability Assessment X
Web proxy X
Application Log Monitoring X X
Packet Analysis X X
DNS Log Monitoring X X
DoS/DDoS Protection X X X
Malware Protection X
NextGen Firewall X
Web Application Firewall (WAF) X X X
Data Loss Prevention X
Inline Malware Destruction X
Application Whitelisting X
Endpoint Detection & Response X X X
Egress Filtering X X
NetFlow Analysis X X
Threat Hunting X X
Encrypted Traffic Inspection X X
eDiscovery X X
Network Analysis X X
Deception Technologies X X X X
Machine Learning X X
Network Forensic Analysis X X
Host-based Forensic Analysis X X
Adversary Containment X
Command Centre X
Customer interaction (call centre) X





Reverse Engineering of Malware X
Public Relations Coordination X
Threat Attribution X
Threat Campaign Tracking X
Adversary Deception X
Hardware reverse engineering X
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Identify
The identification role can be seen as the basis for an organisation’s overall security position. It
calls upon organisations to better consider the cyber-safety threats associated with them and how
to handle them properly. The identification role ensures that the defensive function does not neglect
major properties. With the the use of IoT devices and networks, the information security team faces
challenges to manage such an immense number and activities and sources of security incidents [13].
Defining normal by baselining is a technology that allows incidents to be distinguished from
normal and suspicious or non-standard behaviours. Any analysts in Tier 1 should be notified with
actionable alerting systems equipped with the right baselining technique. These notifications are
prioritised automatically and simplify an analyst’s job. The best practise is to enforce basic standards
for the determination of the usual status and to set the event thresholds in a security monitoring
platform for a long time. If an irregular event is detected by the device, the platform should warn
of the action needed [7]. The lack of such a baseline technique in their security control system is
one capability most organisations are still to achieve, according to the SANS log management survey
2014 [22]. Protect
The Protect Role calls for stakeholders to be informed and apply adequate protections to protect
the data and critical framework at the risk of cyber security occurrences. It is their task to exploit
the organisational safety best practises that may include restricting and monitoring protected access
to both physical and digital networks, applications and devices and providing safeguards against
unauthorised access to these systems. Three critical protective pillar activities that help SOCs are
identified in literature review [9].
i. Baseline Security
– Reduce the surface vulnerability: Server, OS and network component hardening.
– Security of implementation: anti-virus, firewalls, IDS/IPS, PKI.
– Ensure the instructions are followed: Carries out compliance scans and weakness.
ii. Monitoring To detect abnormalities in network traffic, device logs, endpoint data and many
other data sources SOC perform continuous supervision services. SOC A series of rulebooks for
dynamic correlation are used for the retenue of large volumes of log data in order to identify
and detect the legitimate threat from all logs that are received. Since the driving force for
cyber-attacks is a changing state and cyber criminals continually improve their strategies,
security professionals must remain aware of the current threat environment. Therefore, it is
an important challenge in SOC monitoring to change the SIEM settings to detect important
events promptly.
iii. Penetration Test Entry tests can assess the reaction of the system to an attack, the intensity and
the knowledge that the system can obtain from it, as well as its protections against potential
failures.
Detect
The role detect is to develop and enforce a number of activities which recognise cybersecurity
events and allow cybersecurity events to be detected in good time. The relationship (dependency
between SOC entities) technology plays an important role in the process of event detection. The
previous research describes 7 correlation techniques defined as follows [13].
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One of the underlying limitations is the bottlenecks of the response mechanism, given so much
attention on the technologies for detecting threats. There are an overwhelming number of warnings
every day that safety analysts are in ’alert fatigue.’ Manual processes, capability shortages, and
technology inclusion disparities are another issue facing SOC [7].
Respond
The ’response’ feature allows stakeholders to take appropriate measures during a cyber security
incident detection scenario. The ’reply’ feature ensures the proper response planning, contact to
stakeholders, cybersecurity incident analysis, detection of threats and changes in SOC’s efforts under
’identify,’ ’protect,’ and’ detect functions. CIAC is a model of an incident response procedure that
exists since 1989 in the United States Department of Energy’s Computer Incident Advisory Capacity
(CIAC). The model identified six phases: planning, identifying, containing, eradicating, recovering
and learning [7]. Special Publication 800-61 Review 2 proposes that incident response plan organi-
sations should have a formal, targeted, and structured approach [18]. The plan should develop the
requisite resources and management support, such as the task, objectives, and priorities, as well as
senior management approval and an organizational approach to incident response.
Recover
The recovery role recognizes, develops and performs necessary activities to guarantee stability
and restoration of any capabilities or services impacted by cyber safety. The position aids in the
rapid restoration of normal operations in order to mitigate the effects of a cybersecurity incident.
Part of ISIMP is to learn about safety incidents and provide preventive controls, and progress over
time on overall incident management. ISIMP Incident Management [13].
During the retrieval procedure, administrators can retrieve systems in their usual operating state,
check that systems operate normally and, where appropriate, remedy vulnerabilities in the future
to avoid similar events. Recovery can include activities such as clean backup systems, scratch re-
construction systems and files replacement with clean copies, patches installation, password change,
and network network perimeter protection tightening (e.g., firewall rules and the access control list
on the border router) [18]. The remediation role consists of three parts as following in accordance
with best practises or recommended standards, like ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [5]:
i. Recovery planning
The incidents shall be answered in accordance with the documented process in the event of
incidents of protection of information.
ii. Improvements
To minimize the risk or effect of potential events, knowledge gained from the analysis and
resolution of information security incidents is utilized.
iii. Communications
Public relations are managed, and reputations are restored and rehabilitation efforts conveyed
both to internal and external stakeholders and to managers.
Intelligence
The knowledge feature lies at the heart of the SOC. In reality, with a computer emergency response
team they share the same characteristics (CERT). Here, experienced and qualified security analysts
share information with both internal and external parties. Among other tasks, they analyse trends
of threats, track results, define rules on event filters and offer SOC personnel guidance [9]. They
continue to improve their ability to process more data and maximize their ability to use intelligence
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threat to a fully developed SOC. Intelligence sources can also come from historical events, business
partners, the law enforcement cybercrimes division or threat intelligence providers [7]. [11] discusses
three intelligence which, depending on their audiences and implementation, involves the classification
of intelligence into four separate levels.
Table 8: Levels of intelligence [11]

















Time-frame Long-term Short-term Long-term Immediate
Scope General
• Industry sector















Table 9: Sources of intelligence
Internal External
• Network and security devices and applications
• Servers and endpoints machine system logs
• Application logs
• Packet capture and inspection
• Users and application behavior
• Configuration, vulnerability, and
compliance data
• Subscription of free commercial cyber threat
intelligence feeds
• Community shared threat and vulnerabilities
information
• Vendor supplied threat and vulnerability information
• Social media and paste sites
• Alerts from government intelligence and national
CSIRTs
Outside sources provide proactive detection and identification capabilities for intelligence, in
addition to internally gathering intelligence.A common misunderstanding is that signature feeds and
compromise indicators are confused with intelligence. In fact, they make up the whole picture of
intelligence.
Literature Analysis
The findings lack academic debate and arguments in the security and technical sector. The re-
search gap will be filled by further investigations into this topic. In terms of similarity, the significance
of individuals, processes, and technologies for building a SOC is recognised in all studies. The drive,
configuration, operation, and technology used for each SOC model are different. The stakeholder
and functionality within SOC are a strength that can be highlighted and that is well defined. There
are also many drawbacks, for example: Due to the singularity of the source, it is impossible to com-
pare results. There is a lack of adequate, accurate documentation for building SOCs, and literature
focuses mostly on technical aspects.
The table below shows the availability of relevant knowledge in each source of literature:
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Table 10: Literature Analysis








































Tool Selection Yes Yes Yes
Operations Yes Yes
Identify Yes Yes Yes
Protect Yes Yes







Several preliminary research questions concerning the portion of the NGSOC framework remain
unanswered based on the detailed findings of previous related work. Table 7 outlines the functional
requirements needed for integrating individuals, processes, and technologies. There are no proper
standards an organization should behave in line with when it comes to physical safety, personal
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protection, data security and operational architecture. These building blocks not only cover a center’s
technology and process aspects but also the human element as stakeholder, governance, and safety.
It is anticipated that the company can eventually minimize its cyber risks to an appropriate level by
defining criteria for each field.
Table 11: NGSOC Framework (High-Level)


































To meet the needs of these researchers, the NGSOC system was developed to help organizations
disclose accurate and valuable information on the efficacy of their risk management cyber security
programs. SOC must go beyond surveillance and assist with a swift and successful response to
cyber security incidents. The study results will be a major component of the enterprise-wide risk
management program for cyber security organizations. This knowledge will enhance an awareness
of the global security position of companies and allow analysts, executive directors, investors, and
business partners to manage risks.
6. CONCLUSION
Since then, the cyber threat has led to a huge loss in terms of consumer loyalty, security, confi-
dentiality, credibility, and accessibility for many organizations, in the Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT). To initiate a cyber-attack is progressed, organizations need a more proactive strategy for
detecting and retrieving potential events. The results of the research would allow any organization
to create their own software, while mitigating the impact of cyber-attacks, to improve the NGSOC
framework for a future analysis. For future work, the SIEM system engine is used to model a threat
to real life by designing some correlation rules that will be integrated into the system.
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